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ABSTRACT 
Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation  
by Sebastian Kessing and Kai A. Konrad 
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare 
state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic 
effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct 
taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to non-
welfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary 
states.  
 
Keywords: Optimal income taxation, labor unions, work hours   
JEL Classification: H21, H23 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Gewerkschaftsstrategie und optimale Einkommensteuer 
Arbeitszeitbeschränkungen sind ein typisches Merkmal europäischer 
Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Wir zeigen, dass diese empirische Beobachtung mit den 
strategischen Wirkungen derartiger Restriktionen im Rahmen der Optimal-
steuertheorie in der Tradition von Mirrlees (1971) übereinstimmt. Unsere 
Ergebnisse sind robust, solange die Regierung zumindest teilweise ein 
Umverteilungsziel verfolgt.  
1 Introduction
Restrictions on working eﬀort or limits on working hours are well known
union demands and are part of labor market regulations in many European
welfare states. They are less common in more libertarian market economies
where the welfare state is not so important. Evans et al. (2001) document
that workers work fewer hours per year in typical welfare states such as the
Scandinavian countries, Germany and the Netherlands than in the UK, the
US or Australia and that these diﬀerences can be directly linked to the im-
portance of restrictions on working hours in collective bargaining agreements
and state regulations. Anxo and O’Reilly (2000) present a comparative de-
scription of diﬀerent institutional arrangements that restrict working time,
that shows their prevalence in European welfare states. In figure 1 we give
data of high income OECD countries for yearly hours worked and the amount
of government activity in the economy, where the latter variable is taken as
a proxy for the extent of a welfare state. A strong negative relationship
emerges, a finding that is robust to changing the years or using averages.
The theory of limits on working hours mostly concentrates on libertarian
market economies and has not addressed the question why such restrictions
are particularly strong and frequent in welfare states. Among these theories
is the standard argument that such limits increase the relative scarcity of
the type of labor they represent as a union. Further, in Lazear (1981),
restrictions on hours worked arise as a necessary part of labor contracts in a
world in which marginal product and wages diﬀer optimally in response to
moral hazard problems in a long term relationship between a worker and a
firm. Similarly, specific capital models in the tradition of Mincer (1974) and
Becker (1971) can imply constraints on hours, see Kahn and Lang (1991)
for an empirical assessment of the explanatory power of agency and specific
capital approaches. To our knowledge, none of these theories explain why
1
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such restrictions are particularly pronounced in welfare states, and none of
them address the interaction between these restrictions and redistributive
taxation in a welfare state.
This paper provides a possible explanation for the empirical correlation.
Welfare states redistribute from high-income earners to low-income earners
and weigh this redistribution with its eﬃciency cost. Labor unions will an-
ticipate the government’s redistribution choice, and how it will respond to
changes in the constraints. If the union negotiates working hour restrictions
these will aﬀect the redistribution choice. In this paper we show that the
labor unions’ policy of reducing working hours for the low income groups is
highly rational from the perspective of the group of workers they represent if
the redistributive tax system maximizes a social welfare function that gives
2
positive weight to workers in all income groups. We will also argue that
the same rationale applies more generally if the government policy enacts a
redistribution programme regardless of whether this is driven by welfarist re-
distributional preferences, or more generally by a political process. However,
governmental redistribution is crucial for the result. For instance, a purely
extortionary government does not induce similar action by union represen-
tatives.
The optimal redistributive income taxation that is pursued by a welfarist
government under some informational constraint as analysed in the classic
papers on optimal taxation (Mirrlees 1971, Stiglitz 1982, Atkinson 1973) can
be seen as a policy that maximizes the expected utility of each of a set of
ex ante identical individuals who face some uncertainty about their future
productivity type.1 We consider a government that follows this particular ob-
jective function. However, the specific weights of the utilities of the diﬀerent
groups in the government’s objective function are not crucial for the result,
and neither are the motivation, or the forces, that lead to this objective func-
tion of the government. We take the redistributional governmental objective
as given and consider how union policy aﬀects the actual redistribution out-
come.2 From this we draw conclusions about the unions’ incentives with
1The optimal tax schedule is the unanimous choice of all individuals who choose a tax
system under the veil of ignorance as this schedule is the optimal insurance contract that
would also emerge if individuals could contract in insurance markets in a state prior to
knowing their own productivity. See, e.g., Atkinson (1973) for discussion. The uncertainty
about future income and productivity creates an insurance demand and this is the standard
justification for redistributive optimal income taxation. Varian (1980) and Sinn (1995)
have made this argument very clear. Agell and Lommerud (1992) take a similar point of
view when considering wage compression as an insurance mechanism.
2In the theory of optimal direct taxation workers actually diﬀer with respect to their
types. This results in a major diﬀerence between this approach and economies with dual
labor markets. For redistribution in these contexts, see, e.g., Lommerud, Sandvik and
Straume (2003).
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respect to implementing maximum restrictions on eﬀort or working hours.3
Our analysis parallels the approaches by Andersson (1996), Boadway,
Marceau and Marchand (1996), Dillén and Lundholm (1996), and Konrad
(2001) who highlight several other strategic aspects related to governmental
redistributional policy. Our paper is also related to a new line of research
in optimal direct taxation that gives it an important role and empirical rel-
evance. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2002) consider the diﬀerent income tax
regimes in several countries and, instead of identifying the optimal tax sched-
ule for given welfare functions, they identify the welfare functions that would
make the respective observed country specific tax system an optimal tax
schedule for this welfare function. This research suggests that the political
process determines the weights of diﬀerent interest groups in a country’s wel-
fare function, but the tax policy outcome is an eﬃcient implementation of
the resulting optimal redistribution programme. If this is the case, we can
interpret our result diﬀerently as giving the labor unions the first move that
can create an additional constraint for this policy formation of the tax pro-
gramme. The tax programme had then to be implemented in this constrained
environment.4
Our results provide an explanation for why restrictions on working hours
3Note that such maximum restrictions can be in line with the important general as-
sumption in optimal income taxation that individuals’ actual eﬀort, and hence, their type,
is private information and cannot be observed by others. We will discuss this when con-
sidering the formal analysis.
4There is also a recent literature which adds considerable insights to the classical op-
timal tax literature on the normative question of how to design the optimal tax schedule.
Mild assumptions about preferences are suﬃcient to establish important qualitative prop-
erties of the optimal tax schedule (see, e.g., Diamond (1998), Saez (2001, 2002), and
Homburg (2002a, 2002b). Our contribution diﬀers from this line of research. We do not
consider such optimal tax questions. Instead, we consider strategic questions. In particu-
lar, we ask how the unions can change the government’s incentives to redistribute income
within an optimal tax framework.
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and working conditions are particularly important in welfare states that is
based on a strategic interaction between unions and a welfarist government.
Intuitively, the group of low-income earners restrict their earnings capability,
and, in the context of redistribution by a welfarist government, this will
induce more redistribution towards this group. The actual results here are
derived in Mirrlees’ second-best framework of optimal income taxation. The
strategic incentives that show up in this analysis are related to what has been
discussed as the Samaritan’s dilemma (Buchanan 1975, Bruce and Waldman
1990) or the ”strategic advantage of being poor” (Konrad 1994) in diﬀerent
contexts. Unlike this literature, however, the mechanics are more indirect
here, as they work via the eﬀect of union policy on the individual incentive
compatibility constraints.
We outline a framework that can analyse this interaction and establish the
main results in section 2. We show that unions have an incentive to reduce
the constraint on eﬀort for low-income earners below the level that results
from the standard optimal tax programme. We also show that measures that
uniformly reduce the productivity of the type of workers who already have
low productivity can, but need not have similar strategic eﬀects. In section 3
we discuss how, and to what extent, our results apply if governments are not
welfarist. We argue that the qualitative findings are robust to worlds in which
the political process reflects some preferences for redistribution between in-
come groups, even if these preferences simply result from voting, lobbying or
coalition formation of interest groups. We also show that the result does not
sustain with purely extortionary governments. In section 4 we discuss some
of the main assumptions made in the paper. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Welfarist governments
Consider the following version of a static two type optimal direct taxation
model, similar to Stiglitz (1982). Let there be a continuum [0, 1] of workers
who are employed in an industry in which their gross income or wage equals
their output that is perfectly observable and equal to mi for individual i.
Generating these earnings brings a disutility of eﬀort that depends on the
amount of output and on the productivity of the individual. ‘Nature’ decides
about each individual’s productivity and there are two productivity types.
Individuals who have low productivity need ei = mi units of eﬀort to generate
mi, whereas individuals who have high productivity have lower eﬀort ei =
ρmi, with 0 < ρ < 1. A share h of individuals is highly productive, the other
share has low productivity. Individuals know their own productivity when
making choices in the labor market, and the size of h is common knowledge.
The workers’ disutility of eﬀort is measured by a function ϕ(ei) with
derivatives ϕ0(ei) > 0, ϕ00(ei) > 0, and ϕ000(ei) ≥ 0. The marginal disutility of
eﬀort is positive, increasing in eﬀort, and convex5. Since we will consider a
direct mechanism in which the government oﬀers contracts specifying gross
and net incomes, we define the disutility in terms of gross incomes
ψH (m) ≡ ϕ (ρm) and ψL (m) ≡ ϕ (m) . (1)
Once the workers know their own productivities, the union installs a
mechanism that eﬀectively constrains ei from above. Unions choose some e¯
such that ei ≤ e¯. We do not ask how exactly this constraint works and assume
that this maximum constraint can be enforced without requiring actual eﬀort
to be observable. For instance, a time constraint from above will work. If
there is a maximum of 35 working hours in a week that can be spent at the
5Convexity of the marginal eﬀort function is assumed in order to rule out the desirability
of a randomizing mechanism which has been discussed, e.g., in Stiglitz (1982).
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work place or the oﬃce, there is a limit on what a worker can do, but during
these hours a worker can still exert more or less eﬀort and do more or less
work.
It is very important to note that the kind of unobservability of eﬀort (and
type) that is the starting point of optimal income taxation is fully compatible
with the assumption of a labor union constraining total eﬀort from above in
the sense of such a maximum constraint, e.g., on working hours. This can be
seen as follows. For the two types of productivities, the maximum constraint
generates diﬀerent sets of feasible output. The maximum output is m¯L = e¯
for the less productive type and m¯H = e¯/ρ for the more productive type,
with m¯L < m¯H by ρ < 1. The feasible output choices of the productivity
types L and H are [0, e¯] and [0, e¯/ρ], respectively. If a worker generates
output in the range m ∈ [0, e¯], the underlying eﬀort and, hence, the worker’s
type, cannot be directly infered because both types could produce this output
within the restrictions imposed. Only if a worker generates income above e¯
can an inference be made about his type.
Once the constraint is chosen and implemented, the government solves
an optimal taxation problem in the next stage that is the standard textbook
two-types problem as in Stiglitz (1982), except for the additional constraint
on maximum eﬀort. For this purpose the government maximizes a welfare
function subject to some constraints, both of which will be considered below.
In the case with two types, optimal taxation will eﬀectively consist of a
menu of two pairs of gross income and net income, (mH , xH) and (mL, xL).
Each individual will make a choice. The diﬀerence between gross and net
income is a tax TH ≡ mH−xH on the highly productive types and a subsidy
TL ≡ mL − xL for the low productivity types. The sum of taxes just covers
the sum of subsidies, and this defines the government’s budget constraint.
Individuals i care about their own consumption that equals their net
income xi and about their eﬀort ei. We adopt the convention usual in optimal
7
taxation that all individuals have the same utility function u (xi) , i = H,L.
Individual consumption equals net income, xH = mH − TH for H types and
xL = mL − TL for L types. The disutility from working was defined in
(1) above by the functions ψi (m), i = H,L, using the relationship between
output and eﬀort.
With the share of highly productive workers given by h, the benevolent
government’s utilitarian welfare function is
W = h [u (mH − TH)− ψH (mH)] + (1− h) [u (mL − TL)− ψL (mL)] . (2)
The government maximizes this objective function subject to the following
constraints:
u(mH − TH)− ψH(mH) ≥ u(mL − TL)− ψH(mL) (2A)
u(mL − TL)− ψL(mL) ≥ u(mH − TH)− ψL(mH) (2B)
hTH + (1− h)TL = 0 (2C)
mL ≤ e¯ (2D)
and
mH ≤ e¯/ρ. (2E)
Constraint (2A) requires that an individual with high productivity prefers
to generate (high) income mH and pay (high) taxes TH rather than (low)
income mL and a tax/subsidy equal to TL, that is, an individual with high
productivity prefers (mH , TH) to (mL, TL), and chooses (mH , TH) when mak-
ing a choice between the two. Inequality (2B) is an analogous constraint
for individuals with low productivity. Constraint (2C) is the government’s
budget constraint. Constraints (2D) and (2E) are the additional maximum
eﬀort constraints that are chosen by the union in the state prior to the choice
of tax policy. The government must choose a tax policy that is in line with
these regulations.
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The union by assumption represents the low productivity group. Ac-
cordingly, its objective function is identical with the objective function of a
worker with low productivity
WL = u (mL − TL)− ψL (mL) . (3)
Summarizing, the time structure of the game will be as follows. In stage
1, individuals i ∈ [0, 1] learn about their individual productivity. In stage
2, the union implements a maximum eﬀort. In stage 3 the government
implements the Mirrlees (1971) optimal tax policy for a given distribution
of productivities under the maximum eﬀort constraint. This tax policy is an
income tax (or subsidy) as a function of observed gross income, and possibly,
as a function of productivity, if the government can observe individual pro-
ductivity. In stage 4 each individual chooses his or her actual gross income
and pays taxes or receives subsidies accordingly.
We state our main result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The union has an incentive to induce lower eﬀort for low
productivity workers than in the standard optimal income tax problem. The
resulting equilibrium (i) benefits low productivity workers, (ii) harms high
productivity workers and (iii) reduces welfare.
For a proof, we have to solve the game. First, as a benchmark, we consider
the standard problem, without the additional constraints (2D) and (2E),
as in Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). The welfarist government chooses
a pair of admissible combinations of gross earnings and taxes, (mL, TL) and
(mH , TH), that maximize (2) subject to the constraints (2A), (2B), and (2C).
As is well known, (2A) will be binding, whereas (2B) is not. The Lagrangian
representing the maximization problem using (2C) to substitute for TL is
L =W + λ
∙
u(mH − TH)− ψH(mH)− u(mL +
hTH
1− h) + ψH(mL)
¸
. (4)
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The first-order conditions with respect to mH , mL and TH are
(h+ λ)[u0(xH)− ψ0H(mH)] = 0 (5)
(1− h)[u0(xL)− ψ0L(mL)]− λ[u0(xL)− ψ0H(mL)] = 0, and (6)
−hu0(xH) + hu0(xL) + λ[−u0(xH)−
h
1− hu
0(xL)] = 0. (7)
These conditions have standard interpretations. For instance, (5) describes
the ”no distortion at the top” property of the solution, and the other con-
ditions describe the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. By eliminating the Lagrange
multiplier, (6) and (7) can be rearranged describing this tradeoﬀ as
u0 (xL)− ψ0L (mL)−
u0 (xL)− ψ0H (mL)
1−h
h
u0 (xH) + u0 (xL)
[u0 (xL)− u0 (xH)] = 0. (8)
We denote the solution to this problem as (mˆH , TˆH), (mˆL, TˆL) and by xˆH ,
xˆL the corresponding consumption levels.
The union changes this optimization problem if it chooses e¯ < mˆL. In this
case, (2D) becomes binding. Assuming that (2E) does not become binding in
what follows, the first-order conditions become (5), (7), and mL = e¯ replaces
(6). These conditions determine the optimal redistributive tax programme
for a binding maximum eﬀort for the low-income types.
A suﬃcient condition for the union to have an incentive to choose such a
binding maximum eﬀort is whether the utility of the low income employees
increases at e¯ = mˆL for a marginal reduction in e¯. We consider this in two
steps. First we calculate the reaction of the optimal tax transfer, if there
exists an exogenous restriction on maximum eﬀort and this restriction is
changed. Second, we consider how this will aﬀect the utility of the union
members.
If mL is given exogenously and assumed to be binding, (6) drops from the
solution of the redistribution problem. The remaining endogenous variables
mH , TH and λ are implicitly defined by the system of (5), (7) and (2A).
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Using the implicit function theorem we can calculate the comparative static
eﬀect of a change in the exogenous e¯ on the endogenous transfer TH from
this entire system:
∂TH
∂e¯
¯¯¯¯
e¯=mˆL
= − [u
0 (xˆL)− ψ0H (mˆL)]
h
1−hu
0 (xˆL) + u0 (xˆH)
< 0. (9)
A reduction in the hours constraint will cause an increase in the transfer.
Although derived from the entire system, the intuition of this comparative
static reaction originates in the nature of the incentive compatibility con-
straint. If mL is higher by one marginal unit, the utility of an H type from
pretending to be an L type increases by u0 (xˆL) − ψ0H (mˆL) > 0, i.e., by the
diﬀerence in marginal consumption utility and marginal disutility from work-
ing if he worked and consumed like an L type. This magnitude is given in the
numerator. In order to keep the incentive compatibility constraint binding,
the government needs to reduce the transfer from H types to L types ac-
cordingly. This transfer must be weighted with the marginal utilities and the
potential diﬀerence in the number of high and low productivity types. This is
given in the denominator. The working time reduction by the union weakens
the incentive compatibility constraint the government is facing. This enables
and induces the government to further increase the transfer from H types to
L types.
We still have to see how the union’s welfare will be aﬀected. Using (9),
the eﬀect on its objective function of an increase in the hours constraint at
mˆL is
∂WL
∂e¯
¯¯¯¯
e¯=mˆL
= u0 (xˆL)− ψ0L (mˆL)−
u0 (xˆL)− ψ0H (mˆL)
u0 (xˆL) + 1−hh u
0 (xˆH)
u0 (xˆL) < 0 (10)
This follows directly from comparing ∂WL
∂e¯
¯¯
e¯=mˆL
with the government’s redis-
tribution eﬃciency tradeoﬀ (8). This proves (i). Furthermore, the reduction
in mL below mˆL leads to an increase in TH . Since (5) will still hold, this
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implies that u(xH) is reduced and ψ (mH) is increased, causing an overall
reduction of the highly productive workers’ utility. This confirms (ii). W in
(2) is reduced, since the resulting allocation is a feasible choice of the gov-
ernment in the standard problem without the additional constraint as well,
and it was not optimal in this problem. This confirms (iii). ¤
The intuition for the result is as follows. In the standard solution the
utilitarian government reduces mL until the welfare loss from the distortion
of the L types is just oﬀset by the welfare gain from an increase in the transfer
from H types to L types that becomes feasible through this reduction. The
transfer is weighted by the diﬀerence in marginal utilities. The union instead
weighs the increased scope for an additional transfer dollar with the marginal
utility of the L types only.
As briefly discussed in the introduction, the eﬀect is related to what
has been discussed as the Samaritan’s dilemma (Buchanan 1975, Bruce and
Waldman 1990) or the ”strategic advantage of being poor” (Konrad 1994)
in diﬀerent contexts. The L types induce more redistribution from the H
types to their group by restricting their own work eﬀort, and hence, their
own gross income. Unlike in this literature, however, the mechanics are more
indirect here, as they work via the eﬀect of these restrictions on the incentive
compatibility constraint.
Our main emphasis is on maximum working hours, as our analysis was
stimulated by the strong empirical correlation between yearly working hours
and the size of the welfare state. It may be interesting to note, however, that
other measures that could be implemented by the unions have similar eﬀects.
This is illustrated by
Proposition 2 Suppose the union cannot implement a maximum e¯, but can
implement measures that reduce the L types’ productivity. This can (but need
not) benefit the group of L type workers, harm H types and reduce welfare.
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A proof is by way of an example in which a suﬃciently large productivity
reduction leads to the same outcome as the optimal choice of some e¯. Recall
the optimal choice of e¯. We normalized the productivities of types such that
ei = mL for an L type and ei = ρmH for an H type. Depending on these
productivities, the eﬀort functions, utility functions and the share h of H
types, in some cases the equilibrium choice of e¯ that maximizes (3) taking
into account the strategic eﬀect (9) as in (10) may well be e¯ = 0. Consider
such a case. Suppose now that a constraint on eﬀort is not feasible. Instead,
suppose that unions can reduce the productivity of L types by an appropriate
choice of workplace regulation such that an L-type’s eﬀort ei generates only
ei/k units of output. If k can be chosen appropriately, the optimal tax
equilibrium will lead to a solution of the optimal taxation problem with
mˆL = 0. In this case the productivity reduction for L types has the same
implications as the constraint e¯ = 0. ¤
Note that the result in Proposition 2 is a possibility result, whereas the
result in Proposition 1 is much stronger and suggests that a reduction in
maximum eﬀort is always in the L types’ interest if, without such a reduc-
tion, the optimal tax problem has mˆL > 0. More generally, we expect that a
constraint on maximum eﬀort is the superior instrument. Unlike the reduc-
tion of productivity of L types that reduces their productivity of all units of
L-types’ eﬀort, the limit in e¯ keeps the productivity of intra-marginal eﬀort
units unchanged.
3 Non-welfarist governments
Many economists dismiss the view that governments are welfarist. We do
not take a strong point of view on this matter here, as this only partially
aﬀects the results in the paper. For the strategic role of working restrictions
in the low income sector, the question whether the redistributional policy of
13
the government is welfarist or guided by other factors is mostly irrelevant.
The eﬀort constraint will generally change the government’s optimization
problem for any given objective function and, hence, the constraint will have
an impact for the actual redistributional policy that will be implemented.
For instance, if the process of voting, coalition formation and lobbying
leads to a particular objective function that may but need not resemble the
objective function of a welfarist government, the advocates of the low income
groups may still consider it advantageous to influence this process and the
type of redistribution that is implemented if they can introduce restrictions
that influence eﬀort choices in an early stage of this process. An analysis of
this problem will be less straight forward, as the political process needs to
be specified, and it will generally interact with the union policy. As long as
the political process leads to an incentive to redistribute from high income
earners to low income earners, our basic argument applies: the low income
group can typically increase the amount it receives from the high income
group by restricting its own working eﬀort.
The basic argument breaks down if the political process is mapped by a
government’s objective function that does not display redistributional pref-
erences. For instance, in the extreme case in which governments behave as
revenue maximizers and try to extract as much as possible from their con-
stituency as outlined, e.g., in McGuire and Olson (1996) and Olson (1993),
the objective function of the government becomes
T = hTH + (1− h)TL. (2)
Without union policy, the government maximizes this objective function sub-
ject to the constraints (2A) and (2B) and to some reservation utilities of the
two types of workers that, for simplicity, are normalized to
u(0)− ϕ(0) = 0. (11)
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Anticipating that only the incentive constraint for H types (2A) and the
participation constraint (11) for L types is binding, the Lagrangean is
L = T +λ(u(mH−TH)−ψH(mH)−u(mL−TL)+ψH(mL))+µ(u(mL−TL)−ψL(mL))
(3)
The first-order conditions with respect to mH , mL, TH and TL are:
λ(u0(xH)− ψ0H(mH)) = 0 (12)
−λ(u0(xL)− ψ0H(mL)) + µ(u0(xL)− ψ0L(mL)) = 0 (13)
h+ λ(−u0(xH)) = 0 (14)
(1− h) + λu0(xL) + µ(−u0(xL)) = 0. (15)
By (12), the highly productive type’s eﬀort choice will again not be distorted.
Denote the solution to this system of equations as (mˇH , TˇH), (mˇL, TˇL), and
the equilibrium levels of consumption as xˇH and xˇL. We again ask whether a
union that represents the low income earners wants to implement a maximum
eﬀort constraint.
Proposition 3 If the government maximizes T as in (2), the low productiv-
ity type cannot gain or lose from choosing some e¯. However, such a choice
reduces the utility of the extortionary government, and also harms the highly
productive type.
Proof. The first-order conditions can be solved for λ = h
u0(xˇH)
> 0 and
µ = 1−h
u0(xˇL)
+ h
u0(xˇH)
> 0. Accordingly, the low productivity type’s parti-
cipation constraint (11) is binding in the optimal solution. If the unions
determine an mL that is lower than mˇL the resulting utility for low income
types will still be equal to their reservation utility. Further, the reduction in
the utility of the extortionary government follows from a revealed preference
argument. The extortionary government could have implemented this eﬀort
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as the second best optimal extortionary tax policy but has chosen a diﬀerent
tax policy. Third, as λ > 0, the incentive compatibility constraint (2A) is
binding. Therefore the utility of the H type equals u(mL − TL) − ψH(mL).
Using (11) this equals
R mL
0
(ψL(m)−ψH(m))dm which is a strictly increasing
function in mL. ¤
With an extortionary government, the low productivity types receive their
reservation utility. For this reason they cannot gain from a choice of e¯.
However, an additional binding constraint e¯ will be an additional constraint
for the government, making it more diﬃcult to extract revenue from the
population. The additional constraint will reduce the taxes paid by the
low income group. This also generates some additional slack regarding the
incentive compatibility constraint and allows for higher taxes imposed on the
high income earners. Hence, the high income earners would not want such a
constraint.
4 Discussion
In this section we critically discuss a few assumptions made in the paper,
explain whether our results are robust with respect to some changes in these
assumptions, and discuss a few extensions.
More than two types We assumed that there are only two types of indi-
viduals who diﬀer in their productivities. This assumption made the formal
analysis particularly simple and allowed us to build on the well known two
types model of optimal redistributive income taxation which public finance
economists are particularly familiar with. If there is a larger set, or a contin-
uum, of productivity types, then several adjustments need to be made. First,
the objective function of the ”union” might be less clear as this will not be a
homogenous group of workers of a given type. The union will be most likely
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to represent the group of workers at the lower end of the income distribution
more strongly than the workers at the extreme upper end. Accordingly, in
this case too, the objective function of unions will be biased compared to a
more balanced welfare function representing the whole population. Hence,
qualitatively the same strategic incentives will remain. Further, with more
than two productivity types too, further constraints on the gross earnings of
the lower productivity types will change the incentive constraint for higher
productivity types. It will typically lead to more redistribution. We therefore
expect that our results generalize qualitatively to the many types case.
Endogenous types An important aspect of income taxation is that the
productivity type is not fully exogenous. For instance, human capital invest-
ment may increase the probability of becoming highly productive. If indi-
viduals first choose their human capital investment, then privately find out
about their productivity type, and then a welfarist government implements
optimal income taxation, time consistent optimal redistributive income tax-
ation leads to a hold-up problem and to under investment. This has been
shown by Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996). Suppose a stage is added
between the stage at which human capital investment is chosen and the stage
at which the welfarist government implements optimal taxation, and in this
additional stage the unions can implement a restriction on maximum eﬀort
as discussed in this paper. Then, as has been shown, the amount of redis-
tribution will go up. As this amount is already too high in this framework,
this time consistent union policy will further aggravate the time consistency
problem outlined by Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996). Subsidized or
mandatory education becomes even more desirable than in the case of time
consistent redistributive taxation without labor unions.
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Globalization As has been pointed out in the context of tax competition,
globalization, and the increase in mobility that could be implied by it, may
reduce the scope for income redistribution. This may aﬀect union policy
in our context in several ways. If, for instance, the productive workers be-
come fully mobile, this will eliminate the scope for welfarist redistribution
completely. However, redistribution was the reason that made maximum ef-
fort constraints desirable from the perspective of unions. This will not be
analysed more rigorously here, but there is a strong intuition that a reduction
in the amount of redistribution that is feasible may make it advantageous for
the unions to give up a policy of constraints on total working hours and other
means for implementing maximum eﬀort constraints.
5 Conclusions
Restrictions on work hours and eﬀort are more prominent and important in
countries with a large welfare state, or, more specifically, in states with con-
siderable redistribution. We show that this observation is consistent with the
strategic eﬀects of such restrictions in a state in which the government re-
distributes from the high income group to the low income group. Intuitively,
the constraints reduce both the pre-tax income and the eﬀort of members
in the low income group, but induces additional transfers of income from
the high income group to the low-income group. We studied this problem
in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971).
However, the eﬀect is more general and our results hold qualitatively if deter-
minants other than the considerations of a welfarist government govern the
redistribution of income. What is needed for the result is that there is some
redistribution between income groups. For instance, in a purely extortionary
government, the strategic incentive disappears.
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